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Historically, surveillance and interference with the generation of ideas as a practical matter, 
has been both labour-intensive and expensive to implement (Schneier 2015) as "[t]he state, 
market, and our social contacts could not monitor our thoughts, our reading habits, and our 
private conversations, at least not in an efficient, comprehensive, and unobtrusive way" 
(Richards, 2015).
After the Snowden leaks of 2013, however, citizens across the world have seen the extent of 
corporate and state digital surveillance (Clark, 2016; King and Lock, 2016). The extent of the
concern this has caused is evidenced in a recent survey undertaken by Mozilla (2017). 
Amongst other things, the survey shows that 92% of respondents have a desire to learn more 
about how to protect themselves online (Mozilla, 2017).
This desire to protect one's privacy online should come as nothing of a surprise; as the use of 
interconnected digital tools has become embedded in our social practices, the data and 
information that we transmit both knowingly and unknowingly has become highly prized by 
various parties. Through weaknesses in the technologies, the way they are deployed, and the 
way they are used, these technologies have been exploited to routinely capture our private 
data and information.
Some technology companies have responded by offering users enhanced security options on 
their digital products and services. However, many providors have failed to make sufficient 
protections available, and so further data breaches that have affected both individuals and 
organisations (Quick et al., 2017). Governments have also accelerated their states' 
programmes of broad, dragnet surveillance. Such aggressive moves limits citizens' human 
right to privacy by coercing and forcing technology companies to comply with their 
preference for software designed with weaknesses that can be exploited.
Just last year, the UK Government implemented the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which 
has replaced the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. This legislation has been 
widely criticised for an apparent lack of understanding of some technologies, the over-
regulation of technology, the lack of proper independent oversight, and the not insignificant 
issue that the Government themselves are unable the estimate the scale and cost involved in 
operating the act. (Nuridzhanian, 2016; Bradley, 2016; King and Lock, 2016).
However, it is still possible for users to try to protect their privacy. Users now have the 
knowledge of the surveillance machinery, and more have started investing labour in creating 
better and alternative technologies and cultures of use that are oriented at protecting privacy 
and designing security in rather than out. Balancing some of the operational and 
technological solutions is crucial, and library workers, who are considered only second to 
doctors as fiduciaries of citizen's information, are in a strong position to help their 
communities to address this need to protect themselves (A Society of Chief Librarians/Arts 
Council survey, cited in Pedley, 2015).
Collecting, storing, and managing information and its accessibility is a core element of what 
libraries do. But ensuring the personal data and information that we manage on behalf our 
users is protected, and that our networks, systems, and devices are secure is merely a baseline
for library workers. We need to educate our communities about the risks they are exposed to 
in the digital environment.
As a professional community, library workers share advanced digital skill sets, and our 
ethical parameters of information management position us as candidates to organise, educate, 
and advocate for the use of security enhanced behaviours, practices, skills, and technologies 
to help protect our users’ privacy. After all, citizens "need intellectual privacy to make up 
[their] minds, but [...] often need the assistance and recommendations of others as part of this 
process, be they librarians search engines, or other intermediaries. The norms of librarians 
suggest one successful and proven solution to this paradox" (Richards, 2015).
Essential components of a library's critical and digital information literacy programme should
include: offering training on threat modelling; password creation and storage; web browsers 
and plug-ins; search engines; operating systems; communications and encryption tools; and 
corporate surveillance technologies. All of these are elements of what is sometimes conceived
as “digital citizenship”, again, making it very clear that this whole area is well within the 
remit, scope, and capacity of our library services. Internationally, library workers integrate 
these areas into their professional practice (Pedley, 2015), and in the UK, there has been 
increased support in these areas, both inside and outside of the workplace (RLC, 2015; 
Charillon, 2016).
In our politically incoherent and volatile world, with marginalised communities suffering 
disproportionate risks, libraries can help to reinstate safety into digital spaces. As 
Ganghadharan (2012) noted, "[u]ntil policy–makers begin a frank discussion of how to 
account for benefits and harms of experiencing online worlds and to confront the need to 
protect collective and individual privacy online, oppressive practices will continue". With the 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and the emerging Digital Economy Bill 2016-2017 on the 
horizon, now is the time for libraries to offer the support our patrons need, even if they may 
not yet realise the extent to which they need it. 
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